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NOTES
DRAFTING ATTORNEYS' LIABILITY TO INTENDED
BENEFICIARIES OF A WILL: A REASONABLE
APPROACH TO ACCRUAL OF STATUTES
OF LIMITATIONS
INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 1976 John E. Jones, an unmarried lifetime Indiana
resident, instructed his attorney to draft a will designating various
relatives and a friend as legatees. Jones carefully outlined the distribu-
tion plan, emphasizing a specific devise of his fishing cabin on Lake
Eliza to his best friend and closest confidant, Billy Baker. The attorney
questioned him about this devise and reminded him that the lakefront
property had a very high value. Jones responded that Billy was the
sole person who could fully appreciate the cabin and that his relatives
only wanted the property because of the potential rental income in-
volved. The will was subsequently drafted and properly executed on
July 7, 1976. About six months later Jones contacted his same at-
torney to draft a new will changing only the name of the residuary
legatee and copying all other portions of the first will verbatim. Due
to an oversight, the drafting attorney left out the provision regar-
ding disposition of the lakefront property. The second will, complete
with revocation clause, was properly executed on January 25, 1979.
Immediately prior to the execution of the second will, Jones tore up
the first will with the intent to revoke. Jones died on March 3, 1981;
his final days were spent in a hospital, conversing with his only visitor,
Billy Baker. In the many conversations between the two, Jones had
failed to mention his planned devise of the lakefront property to Bil-
ly. Jones' relatives introduced the will into probate soon after his
death, but due to much conflict regarding the residuary legatee
substituted in the second will, the probate court did not render its
decision until April 13, 1983. The probate court held the second will
valid, upholding the change in residuary legatees.
Upon reading an account of the proceedings in the local
newspaper, Billy discovered that he was an intended legatee under
the first will. He consulted an attorney on the matter who suggested
that he institute a legal malpractice suit against the drafting attorney.
The complaint was filed on April 17, 1983, in the Superior Court of
Porter County, Indiana.
Hodge: Drafting Attorneys' Liability to Intended Beneficiaries of a Will
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
120 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
The defendant has filed an answer and general demurrer to the
complaint, denying liability to Billy. The demurrer states two indepen-
dent arguments for non-liability in this case. The first argument ad-
vanced by the defendant states that intended beneficiaries of a will
have no standing to sue the drafting attorney since they are not in
privity to the contract for the attorney's services.' The second argu-
ment claims that the two-year statute of limitations2 for this cause
of action began to run on March 3, 1981, the date of Jones' death,
and expired prior to the filing of the complaint on April 17, 1983.'
The Superior court judge hearing the case is considering dismissal.
The possible dismissal in the above hypothetical fact situation
involves the resolution of two issues. First, what is the duty owed
by a drafting attorney to the legatees in a will? Second, assuming
a duty is found, when should the applicable statute of limitations begin
to run? This Note analyzes these issues and suggests that the In-
diana courts should recognize a duty on the part of the drafting at-
torneys to intended beneficiaries of a will. Further, the Indiana Courts
should adopt the discovery rule for accrual of the statute of limita-
tions in this limited area of attorney liability.
RECOGNITION OF A DUTY BY DRAFTING ATTORNEYS TO INTENDED
BENEFICIARIES- GENERAL DEVELOPMENT
The underlying rationale for development of a negligence theory
as applied to third party plaintiffs is analytically different from the
rationale for intentional torts.' Intentional tort theory provides liability
to third parties through the doctrine of transferred intent.' The in-
1. This argument is based on the common law theory that since the
beneficiary was not a party to the contract for the attorney's services to draft the
will, he is barred from bringing an action pursuant to that contract. See infra text
accompanying notes 4-10.
2. The applicable statute in the hypothetical situation is IND. CODE S 34-1-2-2
(1967), which reads in pertinent part: "The following actions shall be commenced within
the periods herein prescribed after the cause of action has accrued, and not afterwards.
First. For injuries to person or character, for injuries to personal prop-
erty and for a forfeiture of penalty given by statute, within two (2)
years. ... See Shideler v. Dwyer, __ Ind. 417 N.E.2d 281,
288 (1981).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 115-123. For a discussion regarding
theories of accrual for statutes of limitations in the legal malpractice setting, see
generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, S 388-397, at 445-82 (1981 2d ed.)
[hereinafter cited as R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT].
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, S 53, at 325 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER].
5. Id
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tent of the actor is assumed to transfer to anyone directly injured
by his actions.' Negligent tort theory developed a different doctrine
for liability based upon privity of contract between the negligent ac-
tor and the injured party.' This rule stated that unless the injured
party was in privity of contract with the negligent actor, there could
be no recovery for damages sustained as a result of his negligent acts.8
The rules seemed absolute, but necessary exceptions developed.
Equity guided the courts into diminishing the severity of the
rule in certain instances.' For example, the privity rule did not apply
where the plaintiff made a showing of fraud, collusion, or special cir-
cumstances which would warrant considering it apart from the rule. ' °
Further exceptions to the privity rule have since developed in the area
of products liability beginning with the landmark case of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.1" The MacPherson rationale, propounded by Justice
Cardozo, extended liability of manufacturers to ultimate consumers"
if the negligent manufacture of the product could foreseeably cause
harm to the user.13 The element of foreseeability has proven to be
the primary impetus for consideration of claims asserted by injured
third parties outside the product liability sphere.
State courts thereafter expanded the scope of liability beyond
mere physical harm from the use of a product to include financial
loss14 from negligently administered services." The California Supreme
6. Id. S 8, at 32-34.
7. Id. S 93, at 622-27.
8. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 H.&W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, S 93, at 622-27.
10. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199-200 (1879).
11. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
12. Id. at 384, 111 N.E. at 1051. The purchaser was a third party to the sales
contract between the manufacturer and retail distributor. Id.
13. Id at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053. Dean Prosser cogently summarizes the general
law applicable in instances such as this:
... the absence of 'privity' between the parties makes it difficult to found
any duty to the plaintiff upon the contract itself. But by entering into
a contract with A, the defendant may place himself in such a relation
toward B that the law will impose upon him an obligation, sounding in
tort and not in contract, to act in such a way that B will not be injured.
The incidental fact of the existence of the contract with A does not
negative the responsibility of the actor when he enters upon a course
of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the interests of
another person.
W. PROSSER, supra note 4, S 93, at 622.
14. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 223 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); Doyle v.
Chatham & Phenix National Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
15. See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (notary
1983]
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Court in Biakanja v. Irving"6 held a notary public who drafted an in-
valid will, liable to the testator's intended beneficiaries.17 The Biakanja
court recognized the need for a balancing of factors to arrive at a
determination of duty:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant
will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a mat-
ter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors,
among which are the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defen-
dant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct and the policy of prevent-
ing future harm. 8
The court also acknowledged the distribution of the estate by a will
to be the "end and aim" 9 of the transaction between the testator and
the draftsman. Therefore, if the distribution is frustrated by the drafts-
man's negligence, he must be held responsible to the intended
beneficiaries.' This rationale was soon extended to encompass a duty
by a drafting attorney2 to the intended legatees of a will.'
The six factors involved in the Biakanja decision are equally ap-
plicable to an attorney who drafts wills. The California case of Lucas
v. Harm,' the first case to apply the Biakanja rationale to attorneys,
balanced the interests involved and found them to weigh in favor of
public drafting invalid will, Dickel v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W.
896 (1890); Anderson v. Spriesterbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 P. 166 (1912) (abstract defec-
tive); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bowman, 141 Ala. 175, 37 So. 493 (1904); McPher-
son v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 189 Mich. 471, 155 N.W. 557 (1915 (telegraph
message not delivered).
16. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
19. Id.
20. Id. The same result was reached in the case of Killingsworth v. Schlater,
270 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1972) modified on other grounds, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973).
21. For a more detailed history of the development of attorney's liability to
third parties see, Note, Attorney's Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 126
(1982); Meiselman, Attorney Liability to Third Parties, 53 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 108 (Feb. 1981).
Cf. Guy v. Liederbach__ Pa. - 459 A2d 744, 755 n.1 (1983).
22. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 987 (1961).
23. Id. at - , 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
24. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1961).
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recognizing a duty.25 The Lucas court addressed an additional policy
consideration not specifically mentioned in the Biakanja decision. That
policy consideration is the extra burden imposed on the legal profes-
sion as a whole by the recognition of this duty.' The court weighed
the burden of imposing liability on the profession against the alter-
native that the unrecovered loss be borne by innocent beneficiaries."
The court found the factors to be heavily in favor of the innocent
parties and held that attorneys owe a duty to the intended
beneficiaries.28
The major problem with extending the liability for negligence
to third parties not in privity to the contract for the services rendered
to a client was addressed by Justice Cardozo in another landmark
decision.' The case of Ultramares Corporation v. Touche presented
the court with the question of whether an accounting firm should be
held liable for negligence in failing to uncover an error in financial
statements later relied upon by investors. The court held that the
accounting firm was liable for honest mistakes only to those in priv-
ity of contract.30 To extend liability further would subject the firm
"to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class."" An accountant has no idea to what degree
his opinion will be relied upon, nor for how long it will be relied upon,
nor even who specifically will rely upon it.
This reasoning is not as persuasive when applied in the
limited context of wills drafted by attorneys.3 2 In Needham v. Hamil-
25. Id. at -, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824. Specifically, the court
held that:
As in Biakanja, one of the main purposes which the transaction be-
tween defendant and testator intended to accomplish was to provide for
the transfer of property to plaintiffs; the damage to plaintiffs in the event
of invalidity of the bequest was clearly foreseeable; it became certain,
upon the death of the testator without change of the will, that plaintiffs
would have received the intended benefits but for the asserted negligence
of defendant; and if persons such as plaintiffs are not permitted to recover
for the loss resulting from negligence of the draftsman, no one would
be able to do so, and the policy of preventing future harm would be
impaired.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also Note, supra note 21, at 127-132.
29. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
30. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
31. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
32. One recent case addressed this problem and held that it was reasonable
to impose a duty on the drafting attorney, but limited the Lucas scope. In Guy v.
19831
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ton," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found sufficient basis
to impose a duty on drafting attorneys to intended beneficiaries. The
Court held, citing a pre-Ultramares opinion by Cardozo, u that where
the impact upon the third party is the "end and aim" of the transac-
tion, an exception to the privity rule may be warranted.35 Further,
because of the unique situation of the attorney as will-drafter, he is
not subject to liability from an indeterminate class. The attorney is
subject to liability only to the direct and intended beneficiaries of
the will. 6 By keeping the narrow scope of this exception to the privi-
ty rule in mind, an harmonious and equitable balance can be reached.
The inherent fairness in finding a duty owed by drafting at-
torneys to legatees of a will has led many other state courts to
recognize the duty." Some states remain entrenched in the privity
rule although a trend toward uniform recognition of a duty is evident.'
Liederbach, __ Pa. .. 459 A.2d 744 (1983), the court utilized third-party beneficiary
theory of contract law to find a duty to named beneficiaries. However, such a holding
falls short in the fact situation presented in the introductory hypothetical. To require
a beneficiary to be named in the document denies a cause of action to intended
beneficiaries whose names are inadvertently omitted from a will. It seems more
reasonable to allow the plaintiff to prove that he was intended as a beneficiary than
to deny him a chance of recovering what is rightfully his. In effect he is denied recovery
because the attorney made too big of a mistake by totally omitting his name from the
document.
33. 459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. Ct. App. 1983).
34. The Needham court cited Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275
(1922). Justice Cardozo writing the majority opinion in Glanzer recognized the neces-
sity of holding weighers liable where the weight certificate they issued was the "end
and aim" of the transaction and thus could be foreseeably relied upon as valid. Glanzer,
233 N.Y. at 238-239, 135 N.E. at 275-276.
35. Needham, 459 A.2d at 1062.
36. Id. at 1063.
37. Jurisdictions which have accepted California's doctrine of duty include:
Arizona, Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976); Connec-
ticut, Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 255 A.2d 28 (1966); Florida, McAbee v.
Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hawaii, Silver v. George, 618
P.2d 1157 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980); Maryland, Clagett v. Dacy, 47 Md. App. 23, 420
A.2d 1285 (1980); Mississippi, Felts v. National Account Systems Association, Inc., 469
F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Miss. 1978); New Jersey, Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super, 581,
362 A.2d 581 (1976); New Mexico, Jaramillo v. Hood, 93 N.M. 433, 601 P.2d 66 (1979);
New York, Baer v. Broder, 106 Misc. 2d 929, 436 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1981) (See infra note
44, for explanation of limited application); North Carolina, United Leasing Corp. v.
Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 263 S.E.2d 313 (1980); Oregon, Metzker v. Slocum, 272 Or.
313, 537 P.2d 74 (1975); Pennsylvania, Guy v. Liederbach, __ Pa. - , 459 A.2d 744
(1983); England, Ross v. Caunters, 3 All E.R. 580 (1979).
38. New York has recognized the reasoning but has limited its application
to instances where the attorney has dealt with the third party beneficiaries directly
(face-to-face rule). See, e.g., Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein and Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d
882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1977); Baer v. Broder, 106 Misc. 2d 929, 436 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1981).
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Indiana is one state which has explicitly avoided the issue when
presented. 9 Analysis of parallel developments in Indiana law regard-
ing duties owed to third parties illustrates that Indiana must
recognize the public policy interests which require acknowledgement
of a duty owed by drafting attorneys to third party beneficiaries under
a will.
PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIANA-A NEED TO
PROGRESS FURTHER
The privity rule still retains much of its effect on third party
plaintiffs in Indiana, though the number of exceptions to the rule is
growing. Indiana courts have recognized a duty owed to third per-
sons in products liability,' negligent service installations,4' and even
legal malpractice in a very limited manner.4' The development of the
law in Indiana illustrating advances in these areas leads to the con-
clusion that there is a need to expand the exceptions to the privity
rule to include legal malpractice claims by third party beneficiaries
under a negligently drafted will.43
The first major exception to the privity rule in Indiana involved
utilization of the concept of foreseeability of imminent harm to third
persons as a means of justifying claims by third parties." This con-
Indiana has specifically not dealt with the issue, resolving cases on other grounds.
E.g., Shideler v. Dwyer, - Ind. - , 417 N.E.2d 281 (1981). Illinois, which implicitly
recognized the duty in Byron Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Long, 92 Ill. App. 3d
864, 415 N.E.2d 1361 (1981), recently reversed its trend by denying a duty to intended
beneficiaries of a trust. Favata v. Rosenberg, 106 Ill. App. 3d 572, 436 N.E.2d 49 (1982).
For a general analysis of the trend toward uniform recognition of a duty owed by
a drafting attorney to the legatees under a will, see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT supra note
3, SS 79-81, at 152-162.
39. See Meier v. Pearlman, __ Ind. App. -, 401 N.E.2d 31 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1128 (1981). More specifically, the court in Shideler stated:
At the outset it should be noted that the motion for summary judgment
was addressed, in the main, to the issue of whether or not the action
was barred by the statute of limitations and not to the issue of whether
or not a named beneficiary under a will, who was disappointed by the
failure of the gift occasioned by reason of the lack of professional com-
petence of the lawyer who drafted the will, can maintain a malpractice
action against the errant lawyer. Accordingly, that substantive issue is
not before us, and we intimate no opinion thereon.
Shideler v. Dwyer, - Ind. App. at - , 417 N.E.2d at 283.
40. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
44. Note, Has the Rule of MacPherson v. Buick Been Adopted in Indiana?, 38
IND. L.J. 263 (1963).
1983]
Hodge: Drafting Attorneys' Liability to Intended Beneficiaries of a Will
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
126 VALPARASO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
cept was first announced in Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj,"' a case
involving a contract between a tenant and the Holland Furnace Com-
pany for the installation of a furnace in plaintiffs building." The in-
stallation was negligently performed, causing a fire which damaged
the building. 7 Plaintiff was awarded damages notwithstanding his lack
of privity since the installation was "so negligently defective as to
be imminently dangerous to third persons."'48 This "imminently
dangerous" concept of foreseeability was later incorporated in the area
of products liability as well."
Indiana's inroads into the privity rule continued with the recogni-
tion of the products liability exception. Two important products liabil-
ity cases in Indiana were Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Williams,' and
Eliot v. General Motors Corp.5 The Coca Cola case involved the
manufacture and sale of a beverage containing concrete chips52 while
Eliot involved the negligent manufacture and design of an automobile.'
In each case the defendant was held liable to the injured third party
on the basis of the foreseeability rationale consistent with
MacPherson.' That rationale holds the manufacturer liable to the
ultimate consumer if the negligent manufacture of the product could
foreseeably cause harm to the user.' These cases represent a step
forward in Indiana toward recognizing the need to protect innocent
third parties in other areas of tort law.'
45. 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N.E.2d 339 (1938).
46. Id- at __, 14 N.E.2d at 340-342.
47. Id.
48. Id at __, 14 N.E.2d at 342.
49. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 54-55
and accompanying text.
50. 111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N.E.2d 702 (1941).
51. 296 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1961). See also Gilliam v. J.C. Penney, 193 F. Supp.
558 (S.D. Ind. 1961) (court held that an escalator installer owed a duty of due care
to patrons of the contracting store notwithstanding their lack-of privity).
52. 111 Ind. App. at 512, 37 N.E.2d at 706. Though this case recognized and
accepted MacPherson, it actually held the defendant liable to the limited area of bottled
goods and food which had been previously recognized in Indiana in Daugherty v. Her-
zog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896).
53. 296 F.2d at 129.
54. See 296 F.2d at 129; Coca Cola, 111 Ind. App. at 512, 37 N.E.2d at 706.
55. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
56. See also Allied Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Lamb, Ind. App. - 361
N.E.2d 174, 180 (1977) (court held "In determining whether a duty is owed by a par-
ticular party, the nature of the relationship must be analyzed"). In Clyde E. Williams
& Associates, Inc. v. Boatman, - Ind. App. -, 375 N.E.2d 1138 (1978), the court
held an engineering firm to a duty of overseeing safety of operations at a construc-
tion site in a suit brought by an employee of the contracting construction firm.
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One area in which Indiana has not recognized a duty owed to
third parties is the area of attorney malpractice.57 The case of Meier
v. Pearlman, held that an attorney is liable to third parties only
where the attorney is shown to be guilty of fraud, collusion, or
malicious or tortious conduct.5 9 Initially, this holding seems to gener-
ously liberalize the privity rule by recognizing liability to third par-
ties. However, upon closer inspection it is evident that this is not
the case: the "tortious conduct" on the part of the attorney must go
beyond the bounds of the attorney-client relationship in order to be
actionable;' additionally, the attorney must have asserted his own per-
sonal interest or participated with the client in a fraudulent or
unlawful act."1 The Meier holding does not represent an extension of
the privity rule and thus does not remedy any inequities which exist
regarding claims by third party plaintiffs.2
The Meier decision maintains the status quo as to the conse-
quences of attorney negligence by denying many of the justified claims
of third parties against attorneys. Since "tortious conduct" must be
directed at the third person while the attorney is acting in his own
personal interest outside the scope of the attorney-client relationship,'
the injured party is obtaining no cause of action not otherwise in ex-
istence. If the tort occurs outside the attorney-client relationship, the
third party is simply a directly injured party to that act asserting
his claim against an ordinary tortfeasor who has no protected status.6
Where negligence by the drafting attorney causes intended legatees
to lose their share of the estate, the intended legatees cannot main-
57. Meier v. Pearlman, - Ind. App. _ , 401 N.E.2d 31 (1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1128 (1981).
58. Id.
59. Id. at -, 401 N.E.2d at 40.
60. [Ain attorney acting within the scope of his employment as attorney
is immune from liability to third persons for actions arising out of that
professional relationship. This immunity, to be sure, may not be invoked
if the attorney, exceeding the bounds of this unique agency relationship,
either is dominated by his own personal interest or knowingly participates
with his client in the perpetration of a fraudulent or unlawful act.
Id. at , 401 N.E.2d at 41 (quoting McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35, - , 182
N.W.2d at 437, 440 (1970)).
61. Meier, __ Ind. App. at -, 401 N.E.2d at 41.
62. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
63. Meier, __ Ind. App. at , 401 N.E.2d at 41.
64. The third party is not really a third party in any sense if the attorney
negligently injures him while not acting in his official capacity. The attorney is merely
an ordinary person directly injuring another person. There is no "third party" ele-
ment about the transaction.
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tain a cause of action unless they make a showing of fraudulent or
malicious conduct. 5 In so holding, the Indiana courts deny justifiable
claims by innocent legatees and ignore the public policy demands of
recognizing a duty of the drafting attorney."
The public policy behind the recognition of a duty by the draft-
ing attorney is based on the need to give intended beneficiaries a
forum for redress of their losses. 7 In the fact situation presented in
the introductory hypothetical, no one could raise a claim against the
attorney even if both wills were held entirely invalid. Application of
the privity rule in this context insulates the attorney from many reper-
cussions of his work-it becomes a license for negligence. The most
significant policy asserted in defense of the privity rule is that recogni-
tion of a duty represents too great a burden on the legal profession. 8
This burden does not prove as great when considered in the limited
context advocated here. This note does not seek to abolish the priv-
ity rule in all cases of legal malpractice, rather, it expresses a need
to weigh the equities in one particular area of legal practice. The legal
profession is a hearty one and the imposition of this additional burden
upon it merely represents a balancing of the equities involved. The
dependency and trust that a testator places upon the drafting attorney
requires that the attorney bear the responsibility for the outcome of
the will.6"
Once a duty has been established, a question arises as to when
the statute of limitations should begin to run. Statutes of limitations
bar claims that are not brought within a specified time." The issue
remaining unresolved is when may a claim of attorney negligence by
disappointed legatees be barred by the running of the statute?
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS -PURPOSES FOR THE STATUES AND
DEFINITIONS FOR ACCRUAL
Statutes of Limitations exist in all jurisdictions to restrict the
period during which a valid claim may be brought." They are designed
65. Meier, __ Ind. App. at -, 401 N.E.2d at 41.
66. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
69. An additional question beyond the scope of this note is whether liability
in these instances should be limited to an absolute amount, akin to the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act, IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-2 et. seq. (1977), which limits a doctor's liability for
malpractice to $100,000 maximum per patient.
70. See infra note 71-73 and accompanying text.
71. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, S 380, at 425.
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as statutes of "repose" protecting the defendant from stale claims and
unpreserved evidence." The justification given for these statutes
relates first to the need for defendants to be free from claims resulting
from work done in the distant past, and second to the accuracy of
long-term record-keeping.' No one wants to be haunted by past
iistakes, but when is it equitable to bar an existing cause of action?
This question may be answered differently depending upon the con-
text of the claim.
The introductory hypothetical presents a scenario not uncommon
in statute of limitations cases. When is it equitable to bar the claim?
There are three possibilities. 4 The first accrues the statute of limita-
tions at the date of the occurrence of the negligent act-the drafting
of the will.75 If the statute begins running at the drafting date, the
claim is barred two years later' on January 25, 1979, which is before
the testator died.7 The second possibility accrues the statute at the
date of damage,78 which Indiana has recognized to be the date of the
testator's death.79 Under this rule Baker's claim is barred on March
3, 19838°- before probate determination. 1 The final possibility for ac-
crual of the statute rests upon the discovery of a cause of action by
Baker. 2 Under this rule Baker's claim receives a forum for presenta-
tion in the courts. Analysis of these three rules of accrual will yield
the conclusion that the equitable considerations in this unique situa-
72. Id. at 426.
73. Id. "Statutes of Limitations are intended to promote promptness and punc-
tuality in business; the settlement of claims while parties are alive; before papers
are lost and witnesses die; and he who will not take the hint, must take the consequences."
Id. (quoting Glenn v. Cuttle, 2 Grant Case 273, 276, 48 Pa. 524, __ (1853).
74. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, SS 388-94, at 445-78. The scope of
this note precludes discussion of the continuous representation rule and concealment
rule which apply to legal malpractice generally, but have infrequent application to
legal malpractice involving the drafting of a will. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra
note 3, SS 391-92 at 458-68. Note also that some writers recognize only two theories -
i.e., the occurrence rule and the damage rule-by classifying any other theory as merely
an exception to these rules. See e.g., MacGill, Shideler v. Dwyer: The Beginning of Pro-
tective Legal Malpractice Actions, 14 IND. L. REV. 927 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MacGill].
75. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 2 for applicable statute.
77. According to the hypothetical, Jones died on March 3, 1981. This is ap-
proximately two years and two months from the drafting of the will on January 25, 1979.
78. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
79. Shideler, - Ind. .. 417 N.E.2d 281 (1981).
80. This is two years from Jones' death on March 3, 1981.
81. According to the hypothetical, the probate court issued its decision on
April 13, 1983, which is two years and one month after Jones' death.
82. See infra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
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tion weigh in favor of the adoption of the discovery rule for accruing
statutes of limitations.
The Occurrence Rule
The occurrence rule has its roots in ordinary negligence actions"
and has proven to be poor precedent for legal malpractice
applications." In an occurrence rule jurisdiction the statute of limita-
tions begins to run at the time of the negligent act." Therefore, delay
in either manifestation of damage or discovery by the client is not
considered in the determination of when the statute accrues." In an
ordinary negligence setting such as products liability, the rule works
well' because the negligence causes immediate and identifiable injuries
to the victim." However, in legal malpractice situations, this is rarely
the case. The attorney often sets forces into motion which do not
manifest themselves as damage until some future point and are not
discoverable by the client for an even longer time."
For example, the facts of the introductory hypothetical
demonstrate how an attorney's negligence may remain undetected for
years. The omission of the devise to Baker remained undetected until
a fortuitous reading of a local newspaper brought the facts to the
injured party's attention. Under the occurrence rule, however, Baker's
claim for legal malpractice would have expired prior to Jones' death,
that is, before the will even became operative. Because of the un-
favorable result in situations such as this, almost all jurisdictions have
abandoned the occurrence rule in favor of the more modern
approaches-the damage rule and the discovery rule."
83. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, S 389, at 446.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., South Burlington School District v. Goodrich, 135 Vt. 601, -'
382 A.2d 220, 222 (1977), which held that an action against an architect for faulty design
and construction of a roof was barred by the statute of limitations that accrued at
the occurrence of the negligent act (here the later of the two acts was construction
of the roof which became the relevant point for accrual).
86. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, S 389, at 449.
87. Id. at 450.
88. Id
89. Id.
90. The absurdity of this application of the rule is self-evident. No claim may
be brought against an attorney for legal malpractice until the instrument is operative
because until then it is subject to change by the testator. Unfortunately under the
assumed facts the statute bars the claim prior to the testator's death which marks
the time the will becomes operative.
91. R. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, supra note 3, S 389, at 451.
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The Damage Rule
Growing dissatisfaction with the inflexibility of the occurrence
rule led many jurisdictions to adopt the damage rule for accrual of
statutes of limitations in legal malpractice situations.2 One such
jurisdiction is Indiana. 3 The damage rule states that the statute of
limitations accrues when the cause of action accrues, which occurs
when an injury to a person manifests itself as damage to that person.'
Damage is defined as an "ascertainable loss"95 to the plaintiff and must
be shown to be proximately caused by the defendant breaching a
duty. It was not until 1967, however, that this basic concept was
applied by a court in the legal malpractice context.97
The initial use of the damage rule produced an equitable result
by renouncing the occurrence rule for legal malpractice." The first
application of the damage rule in a legal malpractice setting occurred
in Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson." That case
involved an attorney who gave inaccurate advice regarding the need
for certification of his client's boats for fishing in Venezuelan waters.
Consequently, when the boats went to Venezuela to fish, they were
impounded by that government."' 0 The issue in the case was whether
the statute of limitations accrued on the date the attorney gave the
incorrect advice or the date the client's boats were impounded."' The
court held that no damage occurred from the attorney's negligent ad-
vice until the boats were impounded, thus the plaintiffs claim was
brought within the statute of limitations period. 1°2 Here the applica-
92. Id.
93. Anderson v. Anderson, - Ind. App. 399 N.E2d 391, 402 (1979);
Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251, (1928).
94. Merritt v. Economy Department Store, 125 Ind. App. 560, 564, 128 N.E.2d
279, 280-81 (1955); Essex Wire Corp. v. MM-. Hilt Co., Inc., 263 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1959).
95. Anderson, - Ind. App. -, 399 N.E.2d at 402.
96. See supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text.
97. Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe and Johnson, 381 F.2d 261
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
98. Id. at 262.
99. 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968). Though this
case was not cited in Shideler, the rationale of the case nevertheless was followed.
Thus, the case is important for being the first case to apply the damage rule to legal
malpractice. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, S 390, at 453.
100. Fort Myers Seafood, 381 F.2d at 262.
101. Id. Note that accrual of the statute at the date of negligent advice
represents the occurrence rule method. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
102. Fort Myers Seafood, 381 F.2d at 262. In this case a three-year statute of
limitations was applicable. D.C. CODE ANN S 12-301 (1966). If the statute had begun to
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tion of the damage rule produced a favorable result, but the question
remains whether the rule represents the most equitable rule in all
legal malpractice cases.
In those jurisdictions which use the damage rule as their sole
benchmark for accrual, plaintiffs can experience a variety of inequities
in the legal malpractice setting."3 The main problem in many of these
cases is ascertaining the date of damage.0 4 This is particularly prob-
lematic in the context of invalid wills because the date of damage
is either the testator's death' 5 or the final determination of the will's
invalidity"' depending on where the will is probated. The Kansas and
Indiana interpretations illustrate these differing views.
The Kansas Interpretation
The Kansas Supreme Court holds that the statute of limitations
barring a beneficiary's legal malpractice claim is tolled during the
pendency of proceedings on the validity of the will." 7 Regarding the
damage requirement, the Kansas court in Price v. Holmes"' maintained
that no cause of action accrued until the will was declared invalid,
therefore the statute of limitations did not begin to run until that
point. O' To achieve this conclusion the court analogized to a case in-
volving the negligent installation of a pipe which eventually led to
an explosion. 11 In that case no cause of action accrued until two years
after the installation when the explosion caused damage."' The court
reasoned that the contest of the will was analogous to the negligent
installation of the pipe since both actions set forces in motion which
ultimately led to damage."' If the contest of the will had been unsuc-
cessful, the beneficiary would not have lost the legacy and there would
be no damage to claim."3 Therefore, the contest of the will did not
run at the date the negligent advise was given, the claim would have been barred.
Fort Myers Seafood, 381 F.2d at 262.
103. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3 S 380, at 426-27.
104. See Price v. Holmes, 198 Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976 (1967). But cf., Shideler,
Ind. at __, 417 N.E2d at 288-89 (Indiana explicitly rejected the Kansas Court
analysis in Price).
105. Shideler, __ Ind. _, 417 N.E.2d 281.
106. Price, 198 Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at __, 422 P.2d at 980-81.
110. Id. at , 422 P.2d at 980.
111. Id. at __, 422 P.2d at 981.
112. Id.
113. Id. Prior to the Kansas Supreme Court ruling, the will had been held
valid by both lower courts. Id. at __, 422 P.2d at 980.
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cause damage to the beneficiaries until it ultimately became
successful." 4 This approach to the damage rule was not well accepted
in Indiana.
The Indiana Interpretation
The Indiana Supreme Court renounced the Price decision by
holding that damage occurs at the testator's death."' The Indiana case
of Shideler v. Dwyer"6 involved a provision in a will which was declared
void." 7 The Shideler court analogized the situation to a case involving
a bridge collapse in order to facilitate criticism of the Kansas
approach. 8 In the analogy a bridge was built in 1871 and collapsed
in 1884 causing injury to the user." 9 In that case the court held that
the statute of limitations did not commence to run until the cause
of action accrued, i.e. upon collapse of the bridge.20 The Shideler court
reasoned that the drafting of the will was similar to the construction
of the bridge and that the death of the testator was similar to the
collapse of the bridge. 21 The damage occurred to the beneficiaries
when the testator died because it was at that point that the will had
its dispositive effect and became irremediable. 22
This holding was subject to a vigorous dissent.2 The dissenting
justices felt that the decision was fatally lacking in reason and equity.
Chief Justice Givan reasoned that the analogy was not complete: if
a parallel is to be drawn, the construction of the bridge parallels the
drafting of the will; the opening of the bridge to traffic parallels the
probate of the will; and, the collapse of the bridge parallels the deter-
mination of validity by the court. 24 Thus, the only practical time to
114. Id.
115. Shideler, __ Ind. at __, 417 N.E.2d at 281.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at __, 417 N.E.2d at 289, (citing, Bd. of Comm'ns of Wabash County
v. Pearson, 120 Ind. 426, 22 N.E. 134 (1889)).
119. Id. at __, 417 N.E.2d at 289.
120. Id.
121. Id. at -, 417 N.E2d at 290.
122. When did damage to Plaintiff result from Defendant's alleged
negligence? Not when the Will was drafted or executed, because it had
to await the death of Moore [testator] before it could have any dispositive
effect. But at his death, the instrument was operative; and, just as the
negligent construction of the bridge in Pearson [see supra note 118] became
irremediable with its collapse under Pearson's weight, the wrong, if any,
set in motion with the drafting of Moore's Will became irremediable with
his death.
Id.
123. Id. at - , 417 N.E.2d at 294.
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accrue the damage is at the point that the beneficiary loses his in-
terest by court decision."5
Analysis of the Indiana and Kansas Approaches
The Indiana majority analysis is fatally defective for several
reasons. First, a will is presumed valid until proven otherwise."6
Therefore, no ascertainable loss" is sustained by the beneficiaries until
the court strikes down its provisions. This is precisely what the
Price court held since prior to review by the Supreme Court of Kan-
sas, the will was upheld by two courts."' The beneficiaries under a
will which is upheld by a court cannot be said to have incurred an
"ascertainable loss." This is self-evident. Damage cannot be incurred
until a court determines that some provisions are invalid."
The second defect in the Shideler court's analysis is the emphasis
placed on irremediability as a determining factor in damage." The
fact that the will is irremediable at the testator's death only marks
the point in time after which the attorney is unable to correct his
error; it says nothing about the manifestation of damage to persons
under the will."' The court is of the opinion that the only uncertainty
existing at the time of the testator's death is the amount of damages."
But of equal uncertainty at that time is whether or not there will
be damage at all. The irremediability of the will is of no probative
value in determining the date of damage because the court may uphold
the will upon probate or contest. If the will is upheld, there will be
no damage because the beneficiaries will take under its provisions.
The Indiana interpretation is equally deficient because of the
defensive position in which it places beneficiaries. Effectively, the
124. Id. at __ 417 N.E2d at 294-95 (Givan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at -, 417 N.E.2d at 295 (Givan, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices
went further, deciding on equity grounds that the discovery rule should be adopted. Id.
126. Ind. Code Ann S 29-1-7-20 (Burns 1976). "In any suit to resist probate,
or to test the validity of any will after probate . . . the burden of proof shall be on
the contestor." Id. Indiana does, however, place the burden of due execution and testator
capacity upon the proponents of the will. See IND. CODE ANN. S 29-1-7-17 (Burns 1976)
and accompanying annotated cases. Note, however, that after the prima facie case
for validity by execution and capacity has been made, the burden is on the contestants
as in most jurisdictions.
127. Anderson, __ Ind. App. at __, 399 N.E.2d at 391.
128. Price, 198 Kan. at - , 422 P.2d at 981.
129. Id. at - 422 P.2d at 980.
130. MacGill, supra note 74, at 940-41.
131. Id.
132. - Ind. at __, 417 N.E.2d at 291.
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Shideler decision forces prospective beneficiaries to file protective legal
malpractice suits against a drafting attorney prior to probate deter-
mination in order to insure their claim in the event the will is declared
invalid.'" The absurdity of this result is that the beneficiaries will
in effect argue for the validity of the will while in probate court and
simultaneously argue against its validity in order to sustain their
malpractice claim." Since the Kansas approach recognizes damage at
the determination of the will's invalidity, these protective suits are
unnecessary.
The Kansas approach yields an equitable result in most cir-
cumstances. However, under the fact situation of the introductory
hypothetical the result is unclear. There the negligence of the attorney
was omission of a provision from the second will. The Kansas court
would be hard pressed to hold that the subsequent court decision
rendering the will valid marks the point of damage accrual. Baker's
lost legacy was unaffected by the court determination since his pro-
vision was entirely omitted from the will. If this is the case, the In-
diana decision is more favorable to him. Yet, even under the Indiana
approach Baker's claim fails, since the statute of limitations has run
by the time he realized he had a claim against the attorney.
The Discovery Rule
In recognition of the inequities resulting from application of the
damage rule for statute accrual, many state courts are utilizing the
discovery rule to alleviate those inequities.' 5 The discovery rule tolls
the statute of limitations until the injured party either discovers or
133. MacGill, supra note 74 at 927.
134. Id.
135. Shideler, __ Ind. at - , 417 N.E.2d at 297 (Givan, J., dissenting). Those
jurisdictions which adopted the discovery rule are as follows: Alaska, Van Home Lodge,
Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981); Arizona, Yazzie v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan &
Tenner, 593 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979); California, Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart
& Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Delaware, Pio-
neer National Title Insurance Co. v. Sabo, 432 F. Supp. 76 (D. Del. 1977); Florida, Down-
ing v. Vaine, 228 So. 2d 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Illinois, Kohler v. Woollen,
Brown & Hawkins, 115 Ill. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973); Iowa, Cameron v. Mont-
gomery, 255 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1975); Maine, Anderson v. Neal, 428 A.2d 1189 (Me.
1981); Maryland, Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969);
Massachusetts, Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974); Michigan,
Sam v. Balardo, 85 Mich. App. 20, 270 N.W.2d 522 (1978); Nevada, Jewett v. Patt,
95 Nev. 246, 591 P.2d 1151 (1979); New Hampshire, McKee v. Riordan, 116 N.H. 429,
366 A.2d 472 (1976); New Mexico, Jaramillo v. Hood, 93 N.M. 433, 601 P.2d 66 (1979);
North Carolina, Troy's Stereo Center, Inc. v. Hodson, 39 N.C. App. 591, 251 S.E.2d
673 (1979); North Dakota, Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981); Oregon,
United States National Bank of Oregon v. Davies, 274 Or. 663, 548 P2d 966 (1976);
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with reasonable diligence should discover his injury .1 3 In the situa-
tion of a negligently drafted will, the rule has the effect of extending
the statute of limitations to a date when the intended beneficiary has
an opportunity to discover that he has lost his legacy. 37 California
is one state which hesitated to adopt the discovery rule, i38 until a pair
of cases allowed it to set forth the rule with precision.1
39
The California Supreme Court brought forth the discovery rule
as a means of circumventing the harsh effect of the damage rule' °
upon the unknowing injured party by tolling operation of the statute
until he has an opportunity to discover his injury.' Justice Tobriner's
opinion in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart and Gelfand '4 noted
the extensive legal history in California regarding the traditional rule,
but concluded that the time had arrived for the legal profession to
become subject to the same standard as other professions.' A signifi-
cant justification for the discovery rule lies in the fact that as the
work of the attorney becomes more specialized and complex, the client
becomes more unable to comprehend the effectiveness and quality of
the attorney's work.' Thus, where the burden remains on the client
South Carolina, Mills v. Killian, 273 S.C. 66, 254 S.E.2d 556 (1979); Tennessee, Woodruff
v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1975) Washington, Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash.
2d 400, 552 P2d 1053 (1976); West Virginia, Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccerello,
157 W. Va. 983, 207 S.E.2d 157 (1974). Some aberrations of the rule have surfaced
also. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489,
632 P.2d 678 (1981) (court adopted the discovery rule where fraud or mistake is in-
volved); Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1977) (court distinguished statutory
wording "capable of ascertainment" to exclude application of the discovery rule).
136. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837.
137. Jaramillo, 93 N.M. 433, __, 601 P.2d 66, 67 (1979).
138. For a detailed history of California's struggle with the accrual of the statute
of limitations for legal malpractice, see Justice Tobriner's majority opinion in Neel.
6 Cal. 3d at 183-88, 491 P.2d at 424-27, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 840-44.
139. Neel and its companion case, Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433,
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971), established the rule in California. For further analysis of Califor-
nia's history concerning the discovery rule see Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limita-
tions: California's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CAL. L. REV. 106 (1980);
Note, The Commencement of the Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Actions-
The Need for Re-evaluation: Eckert v. Schaal, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 230 (1967); Note, Legal
Malpractice-Is the Discovery Rule the Final Solution?, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 795 (1973).
140. Though the court refers to the damage rule as an exception to the tradi-
tional occurrence rule, the damage rule was nevertheless the relevant rule in effect
for the accrual of the statute of limitations regarding negligently-drafted wills. Heyer
v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
141. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 179, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
144. Id. at 187, 491 P.2d at 427-28, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
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to bring a malpractice suit within a prescribed period after the
damage, he must enlist the services of another attorney to review
the work of the first attorney to see if any damage has occurred.'
This is duplicative and costly as well as detrimental to the overall
attorney-client relationship.4" Given the complexity of the attorney's
work, it is grossly unfair to expect the injured party to file suit within
the statutory period commencing at the date of damage when he has
no reasonable means to discover his loss during that period.' 7
The extent to which the discovery rule eliminated other ap-
proaches was refined by the California court. The case of Budd v.
Nixen"' narrowly interpreted the application of the discovery rule.
The fact situation in Budd represented the opposite of the Neel facts:
the plaintiff in Budd discovered the malpractice by his attorney prior
to manifestation of damage."4 9 The plaintiffs discovery was due to a
fortuitous change in attorneys prior to trial.' Although the second
attorney was able to inform the plaintiff of the error, he was unable
to provide him with a remedy."' The court held that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until damage occurred even though
the injured party had discovered the negligence of the first attorney
prior to any manifestation of damage.'52 The practical effect of this
holding is to apply the damage rule simultaneously with the discovery
rule: the statute of limitations begins to run at the point of damage
or discovery, whichever occurs later."'
145. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844. The problems affecting
the testator of the will as client ultimately affect the beneficiary of the will also, because-
the beneficiary loses if there is negligence in the drafting; also, the beneficiary often
has contact with the attorney if acting as attorney for the estate. Heyer, 70 Cal. 2d
223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
146. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
147. Legal malpractice, however is not ordinary negligence. Frequent-
ly, the client did not know and usually could not have known he had a
cause of action because of his attorney's negligence. Unlike plaintiffs in
an ordinary negligence action ... the client usually lacks the special skills
and knowledge necessary to recognize the difference between competence
and negligence. [emphasis in original]
R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, S 380, at 426-27.
148. 6 Cal. 3d at 195, 491 P.2d at 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
149. Id. at 198, 491 P.2d at 435, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 201, 491 P.2d at 436-37, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 852-53.
153. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, S 393, at 471. Some writers have thus
called the discovery rule merely an exception to the damage rule. See MacGill, supra
note 74, at 943.
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The holdings of Neel and Budd greatly enhance the chances of
an injured party obtaining redress against the negligent attorney.
Where damage has occurred, the statute of limitations is prevented
from running until the injured party discovers or should discover his
injury.1' In many instances such as the introductory hypothetical,
claims are allowed which would otherwise be barred by the statute
of limitations' accrual at the point of damage. 5 Under the damage
rule Baker's claim expired before he knew of its existence, since more
than two years elapsed between Jones' death and Baker's discovery
of an intended devise." Even under the Kansas approach Baker
receives no redress," since no court determination was contrary to
the submitted will, there is no damage upon probate decision. Thus,
only application of the discovery rule will save Baker's claim from
summary dismissal.
The discovery rule also better maintains the legal profession's
integrity because the injured party is not forced into additional pro-
tective measures. One example previously mentioned as a safeguard
under the damage rule was checking the attorney's work with another
attorney. The discovery rule eliminates this need by giving the in-
jured party the opportunity to discover his injury on his own before
allowing the statute to run. The need for protective legal malpractice
actions is eliminated as well since the injured party can wait to see
the outcome of the probate court before filing his action. Indeed, if
their provision is upheld they will not have a cause of action.'" If
it is struck down, the time spent in probate will not be held against
them, but they will now be deemed to have discovered their cause
of action.159 The inherent fairness of the rule has led to its growing
acceptance, but the rule is not beyond criticism.
The main criticism of the discovery rule concerns its potentially
unlimited time extension for attorneys' liability, thus negating the pur-
pose behind the statute of limitations."' While this criticism may be
valid, the discovery rule is justifiable on other grounds. What the
court must do is balance the interests involved."'1 The interests on
the side of the attorney are essentially evidentiary and reposeful in
154. See supra note 136-37 and accompanying text.
155. See 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 832. See also supra text
accompanying note 140.
156. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
158. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
159. See generally Comment, supra note 140.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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nature."2 Attorneys cannot be expected to save records forever and
they do deserve to be free from the consequences of their mistakes
after passage of time."3 However, these interests pale in light of the
need for redress of a lost legacy by an intended beneficiary. The
evidentiary interest is usually fulfilled by the presence of the will-
the negligence of the attorney is often evident on its face. The need
for a time of repose by the attorney is outweighed by the need for
a time of discovery by the losing legatee. Certainly, the additional
time involved is better allowed as a time of discovery of loss than
as a time for peace of mind. Examined from these perspectives, the
question becomes simply who should bear the cost of the lost legacy?
It must clearly be borne by the negligent attorney, provided there
are limits on the period of liability. The discovery rule is self-limiting
by invoking elements of reasonableness at two stages of its
application." 4
The objective standard of reasonableness appears in the discovery
rule by the use of the words discovers or should discover to limit the
operation of the rule." First, this gives the attorney additional security
by providing him an affirmative defense of failure by the plaintiff to
exercise reasonable diligence to discover his claim." If this were found
to be true, the question of when reasonable diligence would have
rendered discovery is an issue for jury decision. Second, the court
can impose the burden of justifying non-discovery on the plaintiff. In
so doing, the court will relieve much of the burden on the profession
while still permitting the court to allow the justifiably ignorant
beneficiaries a means of redressing their losses. The combination of
these two aspects gives the courts an element of reasonableness which
affords the most equity for parties involved in the negligent drafting
of a will.
CONCLUSION
Presently, the Indiana courts afford beneficiaries of a will little
protection against negligence by drafting attorneys. The courts must
recognize a duty of reasonable care on the part of drafting attorneys
in order to give the beneficiaries this necessary protection. Once this
162. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
163. See Comment, supra note 140, at 116-18.
164. See generally Smith v. Knight, 598 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (plain-
tiff has burden of pleading and proving facts explaining the lack of discovery); Valerio
v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (necessary pleading of cir-
cumstances justifying point of discovery).
165. See supra note 165.
166. Id.
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duty is established, the courts must press further to balance the
equities in deciding when statutes of limitations begin to run. Often
the equities will balance in favor of the innocent beneficiary. When
this is the case, the Indiana courts must accept the responsibility of
recognizing the justification for delay. The utilization of the discovery
rule with its judicially narrowed self-limitations for reasonableness is
the most favorable choice for deciding the accrual point of statutes
of limitations in legal malpractice actions by intended beneficiaries
of a negligently drafted will.
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